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COMMENTS
Proving Appearance-Related Sex
Discrimination in Television News: A
Disparate Impact Theory
Joanne Balt
A double standard exists in television news. Although both
male and female anchorpersons must meet substantial image re-
quirements, anchorwomen are generally forced to conform to a
much narrower and more demanding ideal of youth and beauty.1
Thus, one former television news executive notes, "TV men can
age on camera, they can be bald and fat ... but women must re-
main attractive. It's a function of our society."'2
Societal norms help to explain this phenomenon. The results
of viewer surveys and other market research tools play a significant
role in the evaluation of anchors.3 By design or application, how-
ever, such tests place a more critical emphasis on the attractive-
ness of newswomen than on that of newsmen.4 Therefore, reliance
upon these tests by television executives may constitute illegal sex
discrimination.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 explicitly prohibits
sex discrimination in employment.' Furthermore, it forbids em-
ployers from relying on discriminatory customer preferences as a
basis for making business decisions.' Despite this statutory protec-
t B.A. 1989, University of California at Berkeley; J.D. Candidate 1994, University of
Chicago.
See notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
Edwin Diamond, New-Girl Network, New York 20 (June 10, 1991).
William A. Henry, III, Requiem for TV's Gender Gap?, Time 57 (Aug 22, 1983).
See notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1992) ("Title
VII"). Under section 2000e-2(a)(1), it is unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or
to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's ... sex." 42 USC § 2000e-2(a)(1).
' See notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
212 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
tion, few lawsuits have challenged the apparent prevalence of ap-
pearance-related discrimination against anchorwomen.
Those cases that have been litigated have been largely unsuc-
cessful attempts to prove individualized, intentional discrimina-
tion. Such disparate treatment claims,7 however, are not the sole
basis for sex discrimination actions under Title VII. The statute
also provides for disparate impact claims,8 under which a plaintiff
may challenge the actual employment practices which adversely af-
fect her gender as a whole." To date, no newscaster has attempted
to bring a sex discrimination suit under this theory.
This Comment argues that disparate impact claims may pro-
vide a more successful means by which anchorwomen can prove
unlawful, appearance-related discrimination than disparate treat-
ment claims. By focusing on potentially illegitimate employment
practices, rather than employer motivation, such claims force both
employers and courts to examine the image-based tests upon
which television decisionmakers rely.
Part I of this Comment examines the prevalence of sex dis-
crimination in television news, paying particular attention to its
effects on anchorwomen. Part II discusses Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and explains, in theory, how disparate impact
doctrine could be much more useful than disparate treatment doc-
trine in appearance-related sex discrimination cases. Finally, Part
III applies the theory to the case of Craft v Metromedia, Inc., 0 in
which television anchorwoman Christine Craft unsuccessfully chal-
lenged television appearance standards under a disparate treat-
ment theory, to demonstrate disparate impact theory's potential
Disparate treatment analysis holds that differential treatment of similarly qualified
persons justifies an inference of intentional discrimination when such treatment disadvan-
tages individuals of protected groups and the employer cannot produce an acceptable expla-
nation. See notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
I Disparate impact analysis holds that the use of selection devices that have an adverse
impact on protected groups constitutes unlawful discrimination, regardless of the employer's
motive, unless the employer can demonstrate the job-relatedness or business necessity of
the devices. See notes 69-76 and accompanying text. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 specifi-
cally provides for disparate impact claims, defining as unlawful "a particular employment
practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of . . . sex [that is neither] job related
for the positions in question [nor] consistent with business necessity." Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub L No 102-166, 105 Stat 1071 (1991), amending section 703 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, codified at 42 USC § 2000e-2(k)(1)(a)(i) (1992).
1 42 USC § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A). For an example of a disparate impact suit, see Dothard v
Rawlinson, 433 US 321 (1977) (plaintiff, a prison guard, challenged height and weight re-
quirements as having an adverse effect on women applicants).
"0 572 F Supp 868 (W D Mo 1983), aff'd in relevant part and rev'd in part, 766 F2d
1205 (8th Cir 1985).
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effectiveness and to reveal how other female newscasters might
successfully approach a similar suit.
I. SEX DISCRIMINATION IN TELEVISION NEWS
A. Television News and the Prevalence of Appearance Standards
News programming is gradually replacing many of television's
traditional offerings." Because it is cheaper to produce than gen-
eral entertainment, it is currently the principal profit generator for
many local stations and a vast, prime time moneymaker for the
networks.' 3 Within this framework, many news broadcasts are in-
creasing their entertainment component to compete not only with
one another, but also with other television alternatives. " Thus, the
line between news and entertainment is blurring.
Not surprisingly, these changes have created neW expectations
for both male and female television newscasters. As show business
values replace news judgment,15 an anchorperson's success may de-
pend more on stage appeal than reporting ability. Indeed, one tele-
vision consultant posited, "I think we are moving into the Ken and
Barbie school ...where the most important requirement for an
anchor is to be young and good looking.""
That television news emphasizes form over substance is troub-
ling in and of itself.'7 This trend towards the "glamorizing" of
broadcast news is even more problematic, however, because it has
had particularly onerous effects on women in the profession.
Although Christine Craft, plaintiff in the highly-publicized
Craft v Metromedia, Inc"5 case, is thus far the only woman to liti-
gate an appearance-related sex discrimination' suit, she is certainly
not the only female newscaster to be subjected to intrusive appear-
ance requirements. For example, when Judy Woodruff became a
" Richard Zoglin, Star Wars at the Networks, Time 70 (Apr 3, 1989).
" Sally B. Smith, News vs. Entertainment, NY Times C20 (Aug 11, 1983).
" Zoglin, Time at 70 (cited in note 11).
" Id ("[O]nce these shows enter the arena with Knots Landing and The Cosby Show,
they must play by the same rules.").
" Henry,. Time at 57 (cited in note 3).
"0 Smith, NY Times at C20 (cited in note 12).
" Phyllis Kaniss reports that television news serves as Americans' main source of infor-
mation. Phyllis Kaniss, Making Local News 241 n 3 (University of Chicago Press, 1991). In
a study conducted for the American Society of Newspaper Editors, moreover, 58 percent of
respondents chose television as their most reliable source of local and state news while only
31 percent selected newspapers. Id at 241 n 2. Thus, television's shift away from "hard"
news may mean that the American public is becoming less informed about both current
events and politics.
18 766 F2d at 1205. See notes 102-12 and accompanying text.
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news anchor in Atlanta in 1972, she was ordered to cut her shoul-
der-length hair.19 Mary Alice Williams, now an anchor for NBC,
was advised in 1979 to change her eye color with tinted contact
lenses.2 0  More recently, forty-four year old Diane Allen,
anchorwoman for a CBS-owned television station in Philadelphia,
filed an age and sex discrimination complaint with the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission after her employer moved her
from the 11:00 p.m. to the 5:30 p.m. newscast in order to replace
her with someone who could "soften" the late-night male anchor.2 1
A thirty-one year old woman was hired to do so. 2
Anchormen have not entirely escaped appearance-related
scrutiny. A number of male newscasters working alongside Chris-
tine Craft, for example, were advised to lose weight and to pay
more attention to their wardrobes.2 Yet appearance requirements
for anchorwomen remain far more prevalent and intrusive than
those applied to anchormen. The television station for which Craft
worked often required its female personnel to change clothes at the
station before going on air.2 4 No such indignity was ever required
of the station's male personnel.2 5 A recent report by the Gannett
Center on Media Studies, finding that male anchors are generally
twenty years older than their female counterparts, confirms the ex-
istence of broad-based, appearance-related inequity between the
sexes.2 1 Thus, appearance standards for television newscasters are
undermining the ability of anchorwomen to compete on an equal
basis with anchormen.
B. The Role of the Anchorperson
Emphasis on an employee's appearance, particularly one who
spends time in front of a television camera, may not be particularly
unreasonable. Even Craft, recognizing the demands of the visual
medium for which she worked, admitted that the maintenance of a
"professional, business-like appearance" was obviously critical to
" Henry, Time at 57 (cited in note 3).
20 Id.
2' Kate Maddox, CBS Hit with Age, Sex Bias Complaint, Electronic Media 4 (June 15,
1992).
2 Id.
8 Craft, 766 F2d at 1213.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Diamond, New York at 20 (cited in note 2) (citing 1988 study by the Gannett Center
for Media Studies).
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her employer's success.27 The difficulty with current. standards of
attractiveness, however, is that they place much more emphasis on
an anchorwoman's appearance than on her professional skills.
Thus, the current standards not only perpetuate demeaning stereo-
types regarding women's abilities, 8 but also undercut women's
careers.
The anchorperson's role is more complex than television ap-
pearance standards suggest. Despite the glamorization of the news,
anchors are not simply good-looking announcers who read from
teleprompters. On the contrary, they are professional journalists
who must tackle varied and increasingly competitive assignments.2 9
For example, as news broadcasts at both the national and local
levels expand the number of investigative reports in their program-
ming schedules, newscasters must frequently interview national
and international leaders directly.30 They are also responsible for
writing and editing copy, selecting appropriate video footage, and
assisting in the ordering of stories.8 ' Although anchors are less in-
volved in daily newsgathering than other television reporters,32
they substantively contribute to the broadcasts.
Moreover, an anchor's professional ability seems to contribute
significantly to his or her viewer popularity. Studies on the charac-
teristics of television news personalities confirm the importance of
non-appearance-based anchoring skills in determining a news-
caster's audience appeal.33 In one such survey, researchers divided
newscasters' traits into two dimensions: likability and compe-
tence.3 4 Likability included the categories of appearance, dress,
personality, voice, and warmth; competence included knowledge,
ability, and analytical dexterity.35 Both dimensions proved to be
27 Craft, 766 F2d at 1214 n 11.
Judy Mann, a reporter for the Washington Post, described the effects of television
on the way society views women:
Television, whatever else it does, is a mirror of society. The Craft case shows that
the mirror does not come close to reflecting the presence and interests of half of
society. It is as distorted a picture of America as an amusement hall mirror.
Marlene Sanders and Marcia Rock, Waiting for Prime Time: The Women of Television
News 147 (University of Illinois Press, 1988).
29 Edward Bliss, Jr., Now the News: The Story of Broadcast Journalism 465 (Columbia
University Press, 1991).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Kaniss, Making Local News at 105 (cited in note 17).
33 See Herschel Shosteck, Factors Influencing Appeal of TV News .Personalities, 18 J
Broadcasting 63 (1974).
See id at 66.
00 Id.
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"distinct in viewer's minds and to provide separate criteria for
evaluation of any single personality." '36 Thus, good looks alone sat-
isfy neither the demands of the profession, nor of the public; legiti-
mate public acceptance requires that an anchorperson develop
skills in critical judgment, analysis, and authoritative news delivery
through both education and experience.
C. The Double Standard
Women first gained considerable access to television news ca-
reers in the early 1970s and have since made notable strides.3 De-
spite their efforts, however, women have failed to achieve fully
equal employment status with men. Their professional competence
remains undervalued and underrewarded. Although women have
outnumbered men in journalism schools for more than a decade,38
they are still significantly underrepresented in important journalis-
tic roles, including that of anchorperson. For example, a 1990 sur-
vey found that only seven of the seventeen evening network news
anchors were women,' and only four women were among the fifty
reporters appearing most frequently on the nightly news.39 Even
more troubling, anchorwomen earn, on average, 23 percent less
than their male counterparts."'
Much of this inequality may be attributable to the damaging
effects of television news attractiveness standards. One writer ex-
plains, "For all the advances women have made in the TV-news
business, glamour and sex-appeal still play a primary role in the
way female journalists are chosen and utilized at both the national
and local level."41 Attractiveness standards thwart the careers of
anchorwomen by emphasizing the importance of appearance over
ability and by defining standards of female and male success
differently.
The pervasive influence of attractiveness standards operates in
a variety of ways. Such requirements may, for example, place un-
derqualified women in positions for which they have neither ade-
quate training nor experience at the expense of others who may be
far more professionally competent. This leads to a perception of
' Id.
' Janet Stilson, Stuck on the Ground Floor, Channels 20 (Sept 24, 1990).
38 Id at 21.
, Dissecting Network News, 118 Information Access Company 40 (Feb 26, 1990).
Diamond, New York at 20 (cited in note 2) (citing 1988 report by the Gannett Center
for Media Studies).
41 Stilson, Channels at 20 (cited in note 37).
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women, generally, as being incapable of succeeding in challenging
news positions or as having to rely on qualities unrelated to merit.
At the local level, for example, many station managers are said to
hire "very pretty women" for their "on-camera appeal," 2 minimiz-
ing the importance of their other qualifications. Thus, if the
anchorwoman performs poorly, the hiring station manager may
"confirm [his or her] own perceptions that women fall short when
it comes to delivering top-flight news reports. ' 43 Even if she per-
forms well, however, her tenure may be limited, for she may be
replaced as soon as her youthful beauty wanes.
Moreover, appearance standards impede qualified
anchorwomen who have worked diligently from achieving promi-
nence and prestige. Because of an overemphasized beauty require-
ment, these women often do not receive the respect afforded to
their male peers. Individuals such as Craft, for example, may be
labelled inadequate, despite their valuable work contributions, 4
because they do not conform to a very narrow conception of the
female ideal. According to one source, those newswomen not beau-
tiful enough to be selected for the "network draft" are resigned to
"pedestrian career path[s]. ' 45
Attractiveness standards may furthermore strip experienced
newswomen of their jobs as soon as their once-beautiful faces re-
flect signs of aging. A television executive explains, "You're just
not going to see your wife or mine, tired and ragged, on TV."' 4"
Instead of being rewarded for achievement and loyalty, women
who have "served their time, chased stories all over the nation and
the world, and earned the lines on their faces and the authority in
their voices, '4 7 are often discarded in favor of a less weath-
ered-and less qualified-pretty face. 8 In contrast, newsmen with
42 Id at 21.
43 Id.
" Craft was praised for her "outstanding achievement in journalism" by a resolution of
the California Senate. Sanders & Rock, Waiting for Prime Time at 147 (cited in note 28).
However, although the news station for which Craft co-anchored experienced both improved
ratings and profits during her tenure, both her station managers and the court found her
demotion to be justifiable on the basis of ten viewer focus group sessions and a phone sur-
vey. Craft, 766 F2d at 1216.
" Stilson, Channels at 22 (cited in note 37), quoting Dr. Joe Foote, chairman of South-
ern Illinois University at Carbondale's radio-television department.
46 Diamond, New York at 20 (cited in note 2).
47 Sanders & Rock, Waiting for Prime Time at 148 (cited in note 28).
41 Marlene Sanders, an award-winning news veteran of thirty-five years, adds, "[F]or all
my years of experience, the networks wouldn't be interested in me ... because of my age
and my style. It's ridiculous." Stilson, Channels at 22 (cited in note 37).
211]
218 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
"decades more experience with key overseas or top Washington as-
signments" are often considered to be ideal anchormen.49
II. TITLE VII AND APPEARANCE-RELATED SEX DISCRIMINATION
A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to "fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's . . . sex."' 50 Judicial interpretation of the statute reflects a
willingness to allow employers a moderate role in shaping em-
ployee image. Such interpretation does not, however, permit em-
ployment policies which would be unfairly detrimental to either
sex.
Under Title VII, courts have delineated the boundaries of per-
missible and impermissible appearance standards. For example,
courts have generally upheld gender-based distinctions in em-
ployer dress and grooming codes when the standards "are reasona-
ble[,] imposed in an evenhanded manner on all employees,' 51 and
do not offer a significant employment advantage to either sex.
52
Such codes, when sensibly applied, are within an individual's
power to alter. The courts therefore reason that these regulations
have only a minor effect on employment opportunities. 3 In such
instances, courts treat the regulations as permissible management
decisions made in the interest of a company's image and success.5 4
The courts, however, have not permitted employment prac-
tices that distinguish between employees on the basis of sex or a
subclass of sex. Thus, an employment classification which discrimi-
4 Id.
50 42 USC § 2000e-2(a)(1)(a) (1992).
s' Knott v Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 527 F2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir 1975) (holding
that hair length regulations for male employees, but not for female employees, is part of a
valid, comprehensive grooming code applicable to both male and female railroad employ-
ees). See also Baker v California Land Title Co., 507 F2d 895 (9th Cir 1974) (upholding hair
length regulations for male title company employees); Lanigan v Bartlett & Co. Grain, 466
F Supp 1388 (W D Mo 1979) (holding that employer's dress code prohibiting women from
wearing pantsuits in the executive office portion of a grain company's home office is
reasonable).
2 Knott, 527 F2d at 1252.
53 Id.
" See, for example, Fagan v Natl Cash Register Co., 481 F2d 1115, 1125 (DC Cir 1973)
("Good grooming regulations reflect a company's policy in our highly competitive business
environment. Reasonable requirements in furtherance of that policy are an aspect of mana-
gerial responsibility.").
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nates against a subclass of all women, such as all women with pre-
school children, is illegal. Classification based on subsets of sex is
known as "sex-plus" discrimination,"s as it specifically disfavors
those individuals of a certain sex "plus" some other identifying
characteristic."
By encompassing such diverse appearance requirements as
dress codes and age-related beauty, television news attractiveness
standards combine permissible and impermissible elements of ap-
pearance regulation.57 Anchorwomen must therefore prove that
their employers' image demands extend beyond the "grooming
codes" allowed by Title VII into the realm of illegal discrimination.
To do so, they must be able to force both employers and courts to
thoroughly unpack the contents of these standards." Only dispa-
rate impact analysis will allow them to do so.
B. The Theories of Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact
A plaintiff may establish her prima facie case of sex discrimi-
nation under Title VII using either a disparate treatment or dispa-
rate impact theory. Under the former, she alleges that her em-
ployer intentionally discriminated against her because of her sex;
under the latter, she claims that a seemingly neutral employment
policy has had an adverse impact on members of her sex, and is
therefore illegal, regardless of her employer's intent." The Civil
Rights Act of 199160 adds new dimensions to both discrimination
theories. Its additions to disparate impact doctrine may prove par-
ticularly helpful in appearance-related discrimination suits.
" The concept of sex-plus discrimination originated in the case of Phillips v Martin
Marietta Corp., 400 US 542 (1971). In Phillips, the Court implied that discrimination with
respect to a subclass of one sex can violate Title VII.
" Circuit courts have subsequently elaborated on the sex-plus notion. See, for example,
Sprogis v United Airlines, Inc., 444 F2d 1194 (7th Cir 1971) (invalidating as discriminatory
an airline's policy requiring female flight attendants to be unmarried). Thus, Title VII is not
merely confined to discrimination between men and women, but also prohibits discrimina-
tion among women.
11 A strong argument may be made suggesting that all appearance discrimination is
especially harmful to women and that Title VII should be amended to make it entirely
impermissible. See Mary Becker, Cynthia Grant Bowman, and Morrison Torrey, Cases and
Materials on Feminist Jurisprudence: Taking Women Seriously (West Publishing Co.,
1993). Such a position, however, has not gained majority acceptance.
" See notes 88-10i and accompanying text.
" See 42 USC §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e-2(k)(1)(A).
"0 Pub L No 102-166, 105 Stat 1071 (1991), codified at 42 USC §§ 1981 et seq (1992).
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1. Disparate treatment analysis.
The Supreme Court first articulated the disparate treatment
theory of discrimination in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green."
This model focuses on the employer's motive. A plaintiff must ini-
tially show that her employer intentionally treated her differently
because of her sex or a sex-related factor. In the television news
context, she might point to differences in treatment between her-
self and a similarly situated male, such as a co-anchor. Alterna-
tively, she might introduce discriminatory statements made by her
employer to justify the inference that the employer acted on dis-
criminatory motives.
The plaintiff's burden at this stage is not onerous. Once she
produces evidence suggesting that the employer's decision was
likely to be based on a discriminatory motive, she has established
her prima facie case.6 Her employer is then given the opportunity
to "rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence
that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason." 6'
However, the employer's burden is similarly light, for its prof-
fered reasons need not have actually motivated the employment
decision at issue. At all times, the burden of persuasion remains
with the plaintiff. She sustains the burden of demonstrating that
the employer's proffered reason did not actually motivate the em-
ployment decision, but was merely a pretext for discrimination.4
Pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, suits for intentional
discrimination may now be tried before a jury.6 5 Therefore,
anchorwomen bringing disparate treatment lawsuits may now ben-
efit from the empathy of their peers.6 No such right existed during
01 411 US 792, 802 (1973). This case involved discrimination based on race. Subsequent
cases have made clear that the same analysis extends to sex discrimination. See, for exam-
ple, Texas Department of Community Affairs v Burdine, 450 US 248 (1981) (applying dis-
parate treatment analysis to public sector gender discrimination suit); Price Waterhouse v
Hopkins, 490 US 228 (1989) (applying disparate treatment analysis to claim alleging gender
discrimination in partnership decisions of private accounting firm).
2 Intl Bd of Teamsters v United States, 431 US 324, 358 (1977).
"' Burdine, 450 US at 254.
04 Id at 256.
" See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub L No 102-166, 105 Stat 1071 (1991).
W6 hile it is unclear whether the introduction of jury trials to disparate treatment
litigation would actually increase a plaintiff's likelihood of winning, the legislative history of
the Civil Rights Act of 1990 -indicates that businesses resisted the granting of jury trials,
claiming it would subject them to the lawsuit "lottery." Kevin M. Clermont and Theodore
Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 Cornell L Rev 1124, 1125
(1992), citing Civil Rights Act of 1990, Joint Hearings on HR 4000 before the House Com-
mittee on Education and Labor and the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of
[1993:
DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
Christine Craft's litigation. Thus, both the district and circuit
court judges trying her case rejected the affirmative findings of dis-
crimination by advisory juries and instead entered judgment for
Metromedia. 7 A second favorable addition resulting from the 1991
Act is the availability of compensatory and punitive damages" in
disparate treatment cases, a change that should increase the incen-
tive for reluctant plaintiffs to bring suit. Neither of these two ad-
vantages is available in a disparate impact case.
2. Disparate impact analysis.
In contrast to disparate treatment theory's emphasis on in-
tent, the disparate impact theory of discrimination, first articu-
lated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v Duke Power Co.," focuses
on the results of particular employment actions. To establish a
prima facie case of disparate impact in a sex discrimination suit, a
plaintiff must show that an employer's decisionmaking criteria
produce a substantial adverse impact on women,70 or a subclass of
women, because of their sex.71 Thus, an anchorwoman could estab-
lish a prima facie case by demonstrating that older-looking women,
brunette women, or heavy women are more substantially affected
by a television station's focus groups than similarly-situated men.
Traditionally, courts have been responsive to the use of statistics72
buttressed by testimonial evidence 7  in establishing a plaintiff's
prima facie case. However, where statistical evidence is unavaila-
ble, strong non-statistical evidence alone is often adequate. 74
Once the plaintiff has met the burden of proving a challenged
employment practice caused disparate impact, the employer may
not merely articulate a justification for its practice, as required
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong, 2d Sess 96 (1990) (statement of Victor
Schachter).
" See Craft, 572 F Supp at 868; Craft, 766 F2d at 1205.
"a See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub L No 102-166, 105 Stat 1071 (1991).
6- 401 US 424, 431 (1971) ("The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.").
70 Id.
7, See notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
," See, for example, Alabama v United States, 304 F2d 583, 586 (5th Cir 1962).
73 See, for example, Teamsters, 431 US at 338 (using both statistics and testimonial
evidence to prove disparate impact).
7, Chicano Police Officers Association v Stover, 526 F2d 431, 439 (10th Cir 1975), va-
cated, 426 US 944 (1976) (holding that paucity of data should not defeat disparate impact
claim); Bunch v Bullard, 795 F2d 384, 395 (5th Cir 1986). But see Williams v Tallahassee
Motors, Inc., 607 F2d 689, 693 (5th Cir 1979) (suggesting that small companies may be
immune from statistical claims because of small universe problem). See also notes 129-32
and accompanying text.
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under disparate treatment analysis. Rather, the employer must
also prove the practice's job-relatedness and business necessity. 8
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 clearly establishes that the burden of
persuasion and production actually shifts to a disparate impact de-
fendant after a plaintiff's prima facie case is established.76
C. Disparate Impact: A Comparative Advantage
The availability of both a jury trial and greater damage
awards for claims of intentional discrimination may increase the
appeal of the disparate treatment theory for anchorwomen plain-
tiffs. Nevertheless, disparate impact theory possesses two very
powerful advantages of its own: beneficial burden-shifting and a
validation requirement. Together, these advantages suggest that
disparate impact analysis should be the preferred method of prov-
ing appearance-related sex discrimination.
1. Burden-shifting and subjective decisionmaking.
Burden-shifting provides a substantial advantage to disparate
impact plaintiffs by forcing the defendant to demonstrate the busi-
ness necessity of its employment practices once the plaintiff has
established her prima facie case. In contrast, the burden of proof
in a disparate treatment case remains, at all times, with the plain-
tiff.71 The particular advantage of burden-shifting to disparate im-
pact plaintiffs "will often be the difference between winning and
losing."78
This evidentiary difference is particularly meaningful because
of a recent broadening of the applicability of disparate impact
analysis. Prior to the Supreme Court's 1988 decision in Watson v
Fort Worth Bank and Trust,79 disparate impact had been applied
only to objective employment criteria. 80 In Watson, a black bank
71 Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, business necessity is specifically defined by case
law. According to Griggs: "[1]f an employment practice which operates to exclude cannot be
shown to be related to job performance, it is prohibited." 401 US at 431. See also Connecti-
cut v Teal, 457 US 440, 451 (1982) (holding that an employer must "demonstrate that the
examination given . . . measure[s] skills related to effective performance").
71 See Peter M. Panken, ed, Labor and Employment Law 56 (American Law Institute,
6th ed 1992). Prior to the 1991 Act, the question as to whether the plaintiff retained the
burden of persuasion was strongly disputed. Id.
77 See note 64 and accompanying text.
78 Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 Harv L Rev
947, 1004 (1982).
79 487 US 977 (1988).
" In Griggs, the Supreme Court invalidated diploma and test requirements not shown
to be necessary to job performance. 401 US at 427-28. The Court's subsequent cases contin-
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employee who had been rejected for four promotions sued her em-
ployer for relying on the discriminatory subjective judgment of
white supervisors in the promotion selection process. The Court
held that "disparate impact analysis is in principle no less applica-
ble to subjective employment criteria than to objective or stan-
dardized tests."8' Otherwise, the plurality reasoned, employers
might insulate themselves from disparate impact liability merely
by combining both subjective and objective criteria into their se-
lection systems.82
Introducing subjective factors into disparate impact analysis
accomplishes a number of favorable results. By definition, some-
thing that is subjective is discretionary, for it "reflects the state of
mind or the feelings or temperament of the ... person think-
ing. "83 Discretionary decisionmaking has long been the practice of
many employers, particularly where the managerial and profes-
sional skills of employees, more difficult to analyze than test scores
or educational levels, are at issue.8 4 Prior to Watson, such discre-
tion was difficult, if not impossible, to question. The Court's ex-
plicit application of the disparate impact doctrine to subjective
processes, however, dispelled any notion that discretionary deci-
sions are immune from impact analysis. Watson thus broadens a
Title VII plaintiff's ability to address qualifications for many
white-collar jobs previously unchallenged by disparate impact doc-
trine, including that of anchorperson. 5
The inclusion of subjective processes also aligns disparate im-
pact doctrine much more closely with disparate treatment doc-
trine. Unlike objective thought, which may be defined as "free
ued to apply disparate impact analysis solely to objective criteria. See New York City
Transit Authority v Beazer, 440 US 568 (1979) (participation in methadone maintenance
program); Dothard v Rawlinson, 433 US 321 (1977) (height and weight requirements);
Washington v Davis, 426 US 229 (1976) (civil service qualification examination).
81 Watson, 487 US at 990.
Id. Justice O'Connor explained that any selection device combining both types of
criteria would have to be considered subjective in nature. Id at 989.
83 David L. Rose, Subjective Employment Practices: Does the Discriminatory Impact
Analysis Apply?, 25 San Diego L Rev 63, 68 (1988), citing Webster's New World Dictionary
1418 (2d college ed 1982).
" For an in-depth analysis of the courts' failure to investigate selection procedures for
high-level positions, see Bartholet, 95 Harv L Rev at 947 (cited in note 78).
88 This result actually seems to have been unintended by the Court. Although Justice
O'Connor explicitly included subjective processes in disparate impact analysis, she weak-
ened the force of impact analysis generally by requiring the plaintiff to retain the burden of
proof at all times and by lessening a defendant's rebuttal requirement. Watson, 487 US at
992-93. These aspects of the Watson decision became law in Wards Cove Packing Co. v
Atonio, 490 US 642 (1989), but were overturned by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
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from personal feelings, '' 6 subjective thought necessarily includes a
decisionmaker's own judgments. Thus, instead of relying on test
scores or other quantifiable requirements, subjective deci-
sionmakers must depend upon their own intuitions. In one sense,
then, subjective disparate impact is based upon some level of in-
tent, even if subconscious, and is thus very much like systemic dis-
parate treatment, where an employer intentionally engages in a
"pattern or practice '8 7 of discrimination. The only difference, of
course, is that the disparate impact plaintiff need not prove
whether her employer harbors an invidious purpose. She need only
demonstrate that the subjective criteria have a disproportionately
adverse effect on women. Thus, the introduction of subjective anal-
ysis to disparate impact brings it substantively closer to disparate
treatment, yet allows it to retain evidentiary advantages unavaila-
ble in the latter.
2. The validation requirement.
Perhaps the most advantageous feature of disparate impact
analysis for the anchorwoman plaintiff is its validation require-
ment. Unlike a disparate treatment defendant, a disparate impact
defendant may not merely proffer a legitimate reason for its em-
ployment procedures, but must actually prove the procedures' bus-
iness necessity. Validation refers to an employer's use of "profes-
sionally acceptable methods" to demonstrate that its hiring and
promotion procedures are "predictive of or significantly correlated
with important elements of work behavior which comprise or are
relevant to the job . . . for which candidates are being evalu-
ated."88 Three different validation techniques have been cited for
use in disparate impact analysis: (1) content validation, which
"measures performance of tasks that constitute a relatively com-
plete sample of those called for on the job"; 9 (2) criterion-related
validation, the primary form of empirical validation to date, which'
analyzes "the relationship between performance on a test or other
'predictor' and performance on the [relevant] job," to ensure that
the predictor actually predicts job performance; 90 and (3) construct
86 Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language 993
(Dilithium Press Limited, 1989) (defining "objective").
87 For a discussion of systemic disparate treatment, see Teamsters, 431 US at 357.
88 Albemarle Paper Co. v Moody, 422 US 405, 431 n 29 (1975), citing 29 CFR
§ 1607.5(b)(5).
88 Bartholet, 95 Harv L Rev at 1016, citing the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selec-
tion Procedures, 29 CFR § 1607.14(C)(I) (1980) (cited in note 78).
80 Id at 1018.
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validation, which focuses on the measuring of mental capacities
presumed important for job performance, to ensure that these
"constructs" actually bear on job performance."1
Unfortunately, because these types of validation have been
utilized previously to validate only objective, rather than subjec-
tive systems, their usefulness in appearance-related discrimination
suits may be limited. Content validation, for example, might dis-
cover the extent to which reporting skills such as writing, produc-
tion, and editing are tested by television surveys and focus groups.
It is unlikely, however, that any of these traditional forms of vali-
dation might adequately test the subjective elements inherent in
television appearance standards. The plurality in Watson, in which
supervisory ratings of employees were based on such subjective cri-
teria as alertness, ambition, appearance, courtesy, and dependabil-
ity, 2 suggested that the difficulty in validating subjective tests
might be a justification for lessening an employer's validation
burdens.9 "
Yet this difficulty need not obviate the validation require-
ment."4 A number of experts argue that subjective systems are, in
fact, capable of validation to the same degree as are objective sys-
tems." Thus, the American Psychological Association ("APA")
submitted an amicus brief in Watson arguing that validation of
subjective systems is practicable if such systems are formal and
scored, and that Title VII should be read to require employers to
use "psychometrically sound and job-relevant selection devices."96
Indeed, some lower courts have adopted a similar position, sug-
gesting that subjective systems might be validated by strict record-
keeping and formal guidelines to ensure that discretionary deci-
sions are based on identifiable goals rather than discriminatory
attitudes. 7
9' Id at 1019.
" Watson v Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 798 F2d 791, 812 n 26 (5th Cir 1986).
93 Justice O'Connor stated, "[C]ommon sense, good judgment, originality, ambition,
loyalty, and tact ... cannot be measured accurately through standardized testrs]." Watson,
487 US at 991.
" For an interesting treatment of this subject, see Comment, Title VII: Application of
Impact Analysis to Subjective Employment Criteria, 24 Harv CR-CL L Rev 264 (1988).
" Id at 270.
Brief for the American Psychological Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, reprinted in Daily Labor Report (BNA) 213 at D1, D5, D10 (Nov 5, 1987).
97 See, for example, Hester v Southern Railway Co., 349 F Supp 812, 817 (N D Ga
1972), rev'd on other grounds, 497 F2d 1374 (5th Cir 1974) (advocating record keeping of
supervisory decisions). One commentator explains, "When an attribute cannot be measured
* . . assessors must record their observations and impressions regularly and systematically.
In some circumstances, once they are so 'scored' or recorded, they can be subject to the
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Thus television focus groups and viewer surveys might be im-
proved through a deliberate recordation system. Both those ad-
ministering and those taking such tests should be required to thor-
oughly describe their thought processes and their own criteria for
assessing anchorwomen. Validation of these writings could help to
differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate questions and
responses.
As part of the validation process, the existence of alternatives
to an employment practice having a disparate impact must also be
explored. Title VII case law demands that an employer institute
any available alternative system that has a lesser impact, so long as
it serves the employer's job needs. 8 Thus, Title VII requires televi-
sion stations to revise those criteria both susceptible to abuse and
replaceable. One commentator suggests that the category of ap-
pearance might be replaced by "neatness of appearance" and "ap-
propriateness of attire."99 Such alternatives might be less prone to
abuse and are furthermore consistent with permissible grooming
code standards.100 At the very least, validation of subjective crite-
ria would force television executives to assess their systems and
revise "conventional criteria which are either unnecessarily vague
or are of questionable usefulness in predicting ability to perform
on the job."' 01
III. DISPARATE IMPACT APPLIED
An appearance-related sex discrimination suit will be more
powerful and convincing if brought under a disparate impact the-
ory rather than under a disparate treatment theory. The Craft case
demonstrates the problems posed by a disparate treatment analy-
sis of appearance-related sex discrimination and suggests methods
by which a disparate impact analysis would overcome such
difficulties.
same validity analyses as other scored instruments." Rose, 25 San Diego L Rev at 90 (cited
in note 83), citing APA brief. A record-keeping requirement is included in the Uniform
Guidelines, and is mandatory under Title VII. Id at 91.
98 Albemarle, 422 US at 425 ("[I]t remains open to the complaining party to show that
other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve
the employer's legitimate interest.").
Rose, 25 San Diego L Rev at 91 (cited in note 83).
100 See notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
101 Comment, 24 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 271 (cited in note 94).
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In Craft, television executives not only censured the plaintiff's
wardrobe,0 2 arguably legal behavior under current grooming regu-
lations,10 3 but also derided her facial structure,10 which is clearly
illegal sex discrimination since no anchormen were ever subjected
to such stringent physical criticism. The defendant furthermore
engaged in "sex-plus" discrimination by relying upon different age-
related appearance standards for anchormen and anchorwomen'0 5
and using viewer surveys and focus groups which placed more ex-
acting, stereotypical demands on women than on men.
The district court in Craft, however, ignored the impermissi-
ble elements of defendant Metromedia's behavior, concluding,
"While we believe the record shows an overemphasis by [the sta-
tion] on appearance. . . [the station's] appearance standards were
shaped only by neutral professional and technical considera-
tions."10 6 Thus, the court addressed only the grooming-code ele-
ments of Metromedia's actions and failed to reach the impermissi-
ble elements of its appearance requirements. On appeal, this
conclusion was affirmed.
A. Appearance Standards and Customer Preferences
The thrust of the Craft suit was the defendant employer's
"concern with appearance-whether the station's standards for on-
air personnel were stricter and more strictly enforced as to females
than as to males.' 0 7 Craft contended that Metromedia maintained
standards that were both based on "stereotyped characterizations
of the sexes"10 8 and more stringently imposed on women than on
102 Craft was purported to possess "'below-average aptitude' in matters of clothing and
makeup." Craft, 766 F2d at 1210, quoting 572 F Supp at 878.
20' Dress requirements are impermissible if they involve "demeaning stereotypes as to
female characteristics and abilities or stereotypical notions of female attractiveness." Craft,
766 F2d at 1215 n 12. Thus, wardrobe regulations that are designed to play upon an
anchorwoman's "softness and femininity" may be impermissible in and of themselves. See
Carroll v Talman Fed Savings and Loan Association of Chicago, 604 F2d 1028, 1032-33
(7th Cir 1979) (invalidating regulation requiring that only women wear uniforms). But see
note 51.
'" See Christine Craft, Too Old, Too Ugly, and Not Deferential to Men 41 (Dell Pub-
lishing Co., 1988).
200 Craft not only testified that Metromedia maintained test files for older perspective
anchormen without maintaining corresponding files for older anchorwomen, see id at 37, but
also that one of the defendant's executives explicitly told her that she was "too old." Craft,
766 F2d at 1209.
Craft, 766 F2d at 1215.
107 Id at 1207.
Id at 1210.
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men. 10 9 To buttress her argument, Craft introduced evidence sug-
gesting that the focus groups and surveys conducted to assess
viewer response to her broadcasts were both biased and inflam-
matory. To one group of interviewees, for example, the focus group
moderator asked, "Is she a mutt? Let's be honest about this."110
While the district court made some mention of the impropri-
ety of the defendant's reliance on such viewer surveys, it neverthe-
less upheld the station's business judgment, stating, "The news
business may indeed have its quirks and vagaries . . but consult-
ant's [sic] reports and ratings routinely serve as the basis for per-
sonnel changes." '111 Ironically, when Craft introduced evidence on
appeal that another source of market research, viewer ratings, rose
quite impressively during her tenure, the court simply retorted,
"This shows only that broadcast market research is an inexact
science. '
The Craft court's selective tolerance of viewer surveys and fo-
cus groups was misplaced. Under disparate treatment doctrine,
customer preferences are not a valid justification for discrimina-
tory hiring practices. 18 Title VII was enacted to prompt employers
"to discard outmoded sex stereotypes posing distinct employment
disadvantages for one sex."1" Thus, policies such as Pan American
Airway's hiring of only female flight attendants'1 5 and an interna-
tional corporation's hiring of only male corporate officers 6 have
been struck down despite claims that they were justified by cus-
tomer preference. One court explained, "[lit would be totally
anomalous if we were to allow the preferences and prejudices of
the customers to determine whether sex discrimination was valid.
Indeed, it was .. . these very prejudices the Act was meant to
overcome."'
17
In contrast, disparate impact doctrine may allow the use of
customer preferences in some circumstances. For example, a law
firm might permissibly hire only those attorneys possessing law de-
109 Id.
"0 Craft, Too Old, Too Ugly, and Not Deferential to Men at 120 (cited in note 104).
".. 572 F Supp at 879.
112 766 F2d at 1216.
11' Diaz v Pan Am World Airways, Inc., 442 F2d 385, 388 (5th Cir 1971).
114 Knott, 527 F2d at 1251.
"I Diaz, 442 F2d at 385.
" Fernandez v Wynn Oil Co., 653 F2d 1273 (9th Cir 1981).
17 Diaz, 442 F2d at 389.
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grees if its clients prefer attorneys so trained. 1 8 While the require-
ment of a professional degree adversely affects those who have
been unable to pursue higher education, it is based on the legiti-
mate interest of hiring well-trained attorneys. Furthermore, reli-
ance on such merit-based criteria does not perpetuate discrimina-
tory stereotypes in any immediate or obvious manner.
Yet disparate impact doctrine should not permit the use of
customer preferences to validate television news appearance re-
quirements. Such discriminatory appearance standards do not re-
flect an employer's need for expert employees. On the contrary,
their adverse effect on women reflects a systematic, subjective bias.
Much like Pan American's preference for the "courteous personal-
ized service"" 9 of female flight attendants which was struck down
under disparate treatment analysis, television appearance require-
ments are based on blatantly discriminatory stereotypes. They en-
able employers to rely on the preferences of their consumers in-
stead of having to defend their own, impermissible actions. Thus,
by analogy to disparate treatment doctrine, such standards should
be held impermissible even under a disparate impact analysis.
Given that subjective decisionmaking is now included in disparate
impact theory, all subjective decisionmaking, including that of the
customer, should be scrutinized under this doctrine. Illegitimate
preferences revealed through viewer surveys are no exception.
B. The Prima Facie Case
Perhaps the greatest difficulty for a plaintiff bringing a dispa-
rate impact claim is establishing her initial prima facie case. Over
the years, statistical analysis has been the preferred method of
showing disparate impact, not only because it has been the only
proof available in many cases, 1' 0 but also because it lends itself
well to the study of objective criteria, which, until the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, was the only basis upon which disparate impact
rested. Thus, in Griggs, the plaintiffs established that the use of
high school diploma and intelligence examination requirements ad-
versely impacted black job applicants by showing that 34 percent
of white males and only 12 percent of black males had completed
118 "[T]he principles of test validation developed under Title VII do not apply to pro-
fessional licensing examinations." Woodward v Virginia Bd of Bar Examiners, 420 F Supp
211, 214 (E D Va 1976), aff'd per curiam, 598 F2d 1345 (4th Cir 1979).
," Diaz, 442 F2d at 387.
o See Marcel C. Garaud, Legal Standards and Statistical Proof in Title VII Litiga-
tion: In Search of a Coherent Disparate Impact Model, 139 U Pa L Rev 455 (1990).
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high school in the employer's state. 121 They furthermore revealed
that use of the company's standardized examinations resulted in a
58 percent passage rate for white applicants, as opposed to only 6
percent for black applicants.
122
In an action such as Craft's, however, because of the small
number of potential newscasters actually applying for and receiv-
ing offers to work at individual television stations, demonstrating a
statistically significant incidence of discrimination might be bur-
densome. This difficulty, known as the small universe problem, re-
sults from the fact that underrepresentation based on only a small
amount of data may reflect chance rather than discriminatory
practices. 2 3 In other words, only a small number of employment
decisions will be likely to be included in the plaintiff's data be-
cause of the sparse number of anchors in any newsroom. Thus, the
reliability of the data as an indicator of discriminatory conduct
must be questioned.'
In the past, moreover, those plaintiffs who have established
prima facie cases of disparate impact have generally proven either
sex discrimination alone, or sex-plus discrimination, on the basis of
purely quantifiable, objective attributes.'2 5 For a more subjective
analysis based on general appearance, a plaintiff may be unable to
compose a statistical test relying on factors other than sex, weight,
and age-which, of course, are not the only factors potentially rele-
vant to a discriminatory defendant. Craft, for example, noted that
the station executives were unhappy with her appearance not only
because they disliked her wardrobe, but also because "one eye is
smaller than the other, and [her] jaw is square.' 2
These difficulties alone, however, should not preclude a plain-
tiff claiming appearance-related sex discrimination from bringing a
case under a disparate impact theory. A number of courts that
have recognized the potential statistical problems given a small
universe of data have nevertheless chosen to allow such evidence.
Some, on fairness grounds, recognize that "the smallness of a sam-
ple should not be grounds. . . for rejecting the type of protection
" Griggs, 401 US at 430 n 6, citing United States Bureau of the Census, United States
Census of Population: 1960, vol 1, Characteristics of the Population, pt 35, table 47.
11 Id, citing Decision of EEOC, Empl Prac Guide (CCH) 17,304.53 (Dec 2, 1966).
13 Bunch, 607 F2d at 693.
124 Id.
"I See, for example, Dothard v Rawlinson, 433 US 321 (1977) (challenging height and
weight regulations for prison employees as discriminatory against women applicants).
'12 Craft, Too Old, Too Ugly, And Not Deferential to Men at 41 (cited in note 104).
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the civil rights statutes afford."' 27 Other courts simply accept such
data to avoid insulating employers from their discriminatory tac-
tics.128 Still others accept a small universe where corroborating evi-
dence of disparate treatment 2 9 is strong and the likelihood of a
random discrepancy is slight. 30 Thus, if a plaintiff should choose
to introduce quantifiable evidence that an employer's decisionmak-
ing process disproportionately affects anchorwomen, sample size
need not be a disqualifying factor.
C. Appearance Standards and the Role of the Court
Craft's Title VII claim may very well have failed because
neither court reviewing her case thoroughly analyzed the viewer
evaluations upon which her employer relied to demote her. Neither
court truly inquired whether the questions posed by such evalua-
tions, or the answers given in return, were impermissibly based on
sexual stereotypes held by either the questioners or the responding
viewers. Instead, both courts relied on the television studio's-in
fact, the television news industry's-general practice of utilizing
viewer preferences to retain or dismiss news anchors.
Pursuant to the disparate treatment framework utilized in the
Craft case, however, deference to a defendant's business practices
was predictable. Under this doctrine, the defendant employer must
merely enunciate some legitimate reason for disfavoring the plain-
tiff. Because Metromedia asserted some plausible, albeit feeble,
sex-neutral reasons for its displeasure with Craft, such as her lack
of knowledge about Kansas City, where the station was located,
and an apparently low level of "enjoyment of her job,"'' the court
could presumably satisfy itself with the defendant's rebuttal.
If, however, Craft's case had been brought under a disparate
impact theory, the defendant's burden would have been much
more onerous. Rather than merely enunciating any legitimate rea-
son for demoting Craft, Metromedia would have been responsible
for proving the business necessity of its employee testing proce-
Chicano Police Officers Association, 526 F2d at 439.
III Bunch, 795 F2d at 395. But see Williams, 607 F2d at 693 (suggesting that small
companies may be immune from statistical claims).
110 As noted above, disparate impact analyses using subjective criteria closely approxi-
mate disparate treatment analyses. Thus, corroborating evidence of disparate treatment
may point to the existence of employment practices' that result in a disparate impact. See
notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
180 Fudge v City of Providence Fire Department, 766 F2d 650 (1st Cir 1985); Page v
U.S. Industries, Inc., 726 F2d 1038, 1053 (5th Cir 1984).
181 Craft, 766 F2d at 1216.
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dures. It would thus have been required to validate its viewer
surveys and other image criteria by showing that they "bear a de-
monstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for
which [they were] used."' 2 Such validation would force both de-
fendant and court to assess the true nature of potentially discrimi-
natory testing procedures.
CONCLUSION
When faced squarely with the question as to whether Me-
tromedia's emphasis on appearance was unjustifiable, the court in
Craft recoiled. It claimed, "[W] e are not the proper forum in which
to debate the relationship between newsgathering and dissemina-
tion and considerations of appearance and presentation-i.e.,
questions of substance versus image-in television journalism.' ' 13
Yet courts prior to Craft certainly decided difficult discrimina-
tion issues, even in the face of great public discord,13 4 and courts
following Craft must do the same. Title VII was not designed to
meet the approval of those harboring biases and prejudice; it was
designed to eliminate bias and prejudice."3 5 Thus, it is clearly "the
court's function to weigh the cost of excluding protected groups
against the cost of interfering with employer choices.""' Difficult
questions regarding substance and image in television news cer-
tainly are within a court's competence and duty to resolve.
The disparate impact model should not be overlooked by
anchorwomen who seek to prove appearance-related discrimina-
tion. This model provides a powerful validation tool that forces
employers to confront potentially discriminatory selection and re-
tention tests. It is therefore much more powerful than a disparate
treatment model for women facing appearance discrimination in all
industries.
13 Griggs, 401 US at 431.
133 766 F2d at 1215.
184 The Supreme Court, in Brown v Bd of Education of Topeka, 347 US 483 (1954), is
perhaps the most notable example.
138 See notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
136 Bartholet, 95 Harv L Rev at 1013 (cited in note 78), citing Robinson v Lorilard
Corp., 444 F2d 791, 799 (4th Cir 1971).
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